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Protocol specifications often identify the roles involved in communications. In multiparty protocols
that involve task delegation it is often useful to consider settings in which different sites may act on
behalf of a single role. It is then crucial to control the roles that the different parties are authorized to
represent, including the case in which role authorizations are determined only at runtime. Building
on previous work on conversation types with flexible role assignment, here we report initial results on
a typed framework for the analysis of multiparty communications with dynamic role authorization
and delegation. In the underlying process model, communication prefixes are annotated with role
authorizations and authorizations can be passed around. We extend the conversation type system
so as to statically distinguish processes that never incur in authorization errors. The proposed static
discipline guarantees that processes are always authorized to communicate on behalf of an intended
role, also covering the case in which authorizations are dynamically passed around in messages.
1 Introduction
Different concepts of role-based performance can be found in modern distributed information systems,
ranging from access control to structured interactions in communication-centred systems. These con-
cepts are typically grounded on the assumption that distinct participants (e.g., users at different physical
locations) may belong to the same role, and that a single participant may belong to (or implement) sev-
eral different roles. Each role is associated with a set of permissions (e.g., privileges to access data or
perform some action), thus enforcing an assignment of permissions to involved participants. In the case
of multi-party interactions, a participant can use a role for communication only if the role is authorized
for the particular action. As an example, consider the scenario of an electronic submission system, in
which (confidential) paper submissions should be available only to only authorized participants. In this
scenario, editors typically rely on other participants who may act as reviewers. As such, any participant
should be aware of the possibility of being appointed as reviewer. Also, a participant should be able to
act as a reviewer only when she is officially authorized by the editor—this means, in particular, that unau-
thorized participants must not be able to read a submission. Furthermore, the exchanges determining an
authorization should be part of the predefined protocols between the editor and the reviewer-to-be.
In this paper, we consider the issue of enhancing multiparty communications with dynamic role
authorizations. Our starting point is the typed framework given in [1], based on conversation types,
in which roles are flexibly assigned to participants that can act on their behalf. While expressive, the
model in [1] does not check whether a given assigned role is indeed authorized to perform a particular
action. The model that we propose here addresses this shortcoming, explicitly tracking the presence of
(un)authorized actions. Our typed model also enables the exchange of authorizations along communica-
tion actions. Hence, participants may dynamically obtain authorizations to act on behalf of a role. We
view our contribution as a first step in modeling and analyzing dynamic role-based communication and
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authorization, focusing on the identification of the basic ingredients that should be added on top of an
existing framework in order to address the problem.
We present the main highlights of our model by formalizing the submission system. Let us assume
the set of roles {professor, student, reviewer, editor} and the following global specification:
(editor→ professor) : auth1(reviewer).
(professor→ student) : auth2(reviewer).
(editor→ reviewer) : extend().
(student→ professor) : report().
(reviewer→ editor) : f inal().end.
Above, role editor is allowed to send authorizations for the role reviewer. The global specification
says that the editor authorizes the professor to act as reviewer, which is followed by passing the
authorization for the role reviewer from the professor to the student. The reviewer gets a deadline
extension from the editor, then student sends the report to the professor. Finally, the reviewer
sends a final decision to the editor. We may implement this specification as the process
Sys = (νsubm)journal⌈editor⌉!paper(subm).P′ | journal⌈professor⌉?paper(a).Q′ | R
where subm denotes a channel and processes P′, Q′, and R are defined as:
P′ = subm⌈editor⌉!auth1(⌈reviewer⌉).P′′
P′′ = subm⌈editor⌉!extend().subm⌈editor⌉? f inal().0
Q′ = a⌈professor⌉?auth1(reviewer).Q′′
Q′′ = assist⌈professor⌉!read(a).a⌈professor⌉!auth2(⌊reviewer⌋).
a⌈professor⌉?report().a⌊reviewer⌋! f inal().0
R = assist⌈student⌉?read(b).b⌈student⌉?auth2(reviewer).b⌊reviewer⌋?extend().b⌈student⌉!report().0
In our process model, each communication prefix α is decorated with either ⌈r⌉ (i.e., role r is au-
thorized to perform α) or ⌊r⌋ (i.e., role r is not authorized to perform α). These decorations define
fine-grained specifications of (un)authorized communication actions. The three subprocesses of Sys for-
malize the behavior of the editor, the professor, and the student, respectively. The first subprocess creates
a fresh channel subm which is passed (on behalf of editor) to the second subprocess (that receives it as
professor) over the message paper on channel journal. Process Sys then reduces to
(νsubm)(subm⌈editor⌉!auth1(⌈reviewer⌉).P′′ | subm⌈professor⌉?auth1(reviewer).Q′′{subm/a} | R)
Here the process authorized as editor sends authorization for the role reviewer to the process acting
on behalf of professor. After interaction, the role reviewer will become authorized in Q′′{subm/a},
so the second subprocess will reduce to
assist⌈professor⌉!read(subm).subm⌈professor⌉!auth2(⌈reviewer⌉).
subm⌈professor⌉?report().subm⌈reviewer⌉! f inal().0
Continuing along these lines, process R joins the conversation on channel subm, gets authorization for
reviewer, receives extend as reviewer, sends report as student, and finally the second subprocess
sends f inal decision, as reviewer, to the process acting as editor. It is worth observing that the initial
specification for the student (cf. process R) is authorized to act as student but it is not authorized to
act as reviewer. The required authorization to access and review the submission should result as a
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consequence of an interaction with the process realizing the behavior of the professor. That is, previ-
ous communication actions directly determine current authorization privileges for interacting partners.
As such, the issue of ensuring consistent conversations is tightly related to issues of role authorization
and deauthorization. To address this combination of issues, the type discipline that we present here en-
sures that structured multiparty conversations are consistent with respect to both global protocols and
requirements of dynamic role authorization (cf. Corollary 1).
This paper is organized as follows. In § 2, we define our process language and illustrate further
the intended model of dynamic role authorization. § 3 presents the type system and the properties for
well-typed processes. Finally, in § 4, we comment on related works and discuss open problems.
2 Process Language
Syntax. We consider a synchronous pi-calculus [10] extended with labelled communications and pre-
fixes for authorization sending and receiving. Let L ,R, and N be infinite base sets of labels, roles, and
channels, respectively. We use l, . . . to range over L ; r,s, . . . to range over R; and a,b,c, . . . to range over
N . A role r can be qualified as authorized (denoted ⌈r⌉) or as unauthorized (denoted ⌊r⌋). We write ⌊r⌉
to denote a role r with some qualification, and use ρ ,σ to range over ⌊r⌉ for some unspecified r.
As motivated above, each communication prefix in our calculus is decorated by a qualified role for
performing the associated action. Intuitively, prior to execution not all roles have to be authorized; we
expect unauthorized roles may have the potential of becoming authorized as the structured interactions
take place. In fact, we expect all actions of the system to be associated to authorized roles; top-level
prefixes on unauthorized roles are regarded as errors. To enable dynamic role authorization, our model
allows for the exchange of the authorization on a role. Formally, the syntax of processes is given by:
P,Q ::= 0 | P | Q | (νa)P | α .P
α ::= aρ !l(b) | aρ ?l(b) | aρ !l(σ) | aρ ?l(r) ρ ::= ⌈r⌉ | ⌊r⌋
Constructs for inaction (0), parallel composition (P | Q), and restriction ((νa)P) are standard. We write
(νa1, . . . ,an) as a shorthand for (νa1) · · · (νan). Also, we write a˜ to stand for the sequence of names
a1, . . . ,an. To define communication of channels and authorizations, our language has four kinds of
prefixes, denoted α . Each prefix is associated to a ρ . Intuitively, a prefix associated to ⌈r⌉, is said to
be authorized to perform the associated action under role r. A prefix associated to ⌊r⌋ is not authorized
to perform the corresponding action as r; but it may be the case that such prefixes are dynamically
authorized via communication. The intuitive semantics for prefixes follows:
- aρ !l(b) expresses sending of name b, in labelled message l, along channel a, under qualified role ρ ;
- aρ ?l(b) expresses receiving of name b, in labelled message l, along channel a, under qualified role ρ .
These two prefixes are taken from [1], here extended in with authorization control via role qualification.
The second pair of prefixes is new to our calculus:
- aρ !l(σ) expresses sending of the qualified role σ , in labelled message l, along channel a, under quali-
fied role ρ ;
- aρ ?l(r) expresses receiving authorization for role r, in labelled message l, along channel a, under
qualified role ρ .
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[R-COMM]
a⌈s⌉!l(b).P | a⌈r⌉?l(c).Q → P | Q{b/c}
[R-AUTH]
a⌈s⌉!l(⌈q⌉).P | a⌈r⌉?l(q).Q → P | Q{a : ⌈q⌉/⌊q⌋}
[R-PAR]
P → P′ ⇒ P | Q → P′ | Q
[R-RESTRICTION]
P → Q ⇒ (νa)P → (νa)Q
[R-STRUCT]
P ≡ P′,P′ → Q′,Q′ ≡ Q ⇒ P → Q
Figure 1: Reduction relation
Operational Semantics. The process semantics is defined via a reduction relation, which is defined in
Figure 1 and denoted →. Reduction is closed under static contexts and structural congruence, denoted
≡ and defined in standard lines (cf. [10]). To support communication of qualified roles, we use a form
of substitution denoted by a : {σ/σ}, representing the substitution {σ/σ} applied only on channel a. In
turn, this includes two substitutions, for prefix subjects and qualified roles occurring as communication
objects, respectively: {aσ/aσ} and {aρ !l(σ)/aρ !l(σ)}. In Figure 1 rules [R-Comm] and [R-Auth] spec-
ify synchronizations: two processes can exchange a message (l) on a channel (a) only under authorized
roles (denoted ⌈s⌉,⌈r⌉ in the rules). Using rule [R-Auth], a process can authorize another process to act
under a role (q) only if the first process has permission to do such an authorization (⌈q⌉) and the second
process is asking for authorization of the same role (q). We use →∗ to denote the reflexive and transitive
closure of → . The following definitions are key to syntactically distinguish authorization errors:
Definition 1 (Unauthorized Prefix / Errors) Let α and P be a prefix and a process as defined above.
- We say α is unauthorized if its subject is associated to an unauthorized role or its output object is an
unauthorized role, i.e., if α = a⌊r⌋?l(b), α = a⌊r⌋!l(b), α = a⌊r⌋?l(s), α = a⌊r⌋!l(⌈s⌉), or aσ !l(⌊s⌋), for
some a,r, l,b,s,σ . We write ⌊α⌋.P instead of α .P whenever α is unauthorized.
- We say that P is an authorization error if P ≡ (ν a˜)(⌊α⌋.Q | R), for some a˜,α ,Q,R.
Notice that an authorization error is a “stuck process” according to our semantics, i.e., a process
which cannot synchronize since it does not have the required authorization to do so.
Example 1 To illustrate reduction and authorization errors, consider processes P and Q below:
P = a⌈r⌉?l2(c).c⌈r⌉?l1(s).c⌊s⌋?l3().0 | (νb)a⌈q⌉!l2(b).b⌈q⌉!l1(⌈s⌉).b⌈q⌉!l3().0
Q = (νb)(b⌈q⌉!l1(⌈s⌉).a⌈q⌉!l2(b).b⌈q⌉!l3().0 | b⌈r⌉?l1(s).0) | a⌈s⌉?l2(c).c⌊s⌋?l3().0
In both P and Q, channel b is used according to the specification (q → r) : l1(s).(q → s) : l3() which
informally says first there is an interaction from role q to role r on message l1, exchanging authorization
on role s, followed by an interaction between q and s on l3 (where, for the sake of simplicity, we omit
contents of the message). We may infer the following reductions for P:
P → (νb)(b⌈r⌉?l1(s).b⌊s⌋?l3().0 | b⌈q⌉!l1(⌈s⌉).b⌈q⌉!l3().0) → (νb)(b⌈s⌉?l3().0 | b⌈q⌉!l3().0)
and so all actions are carried out on behalf of authorized roles. In contrast, we have that
Q →∗ (νb)(b⌈q⌉!l3().0 | b⌊s⌋?l3().0).
and so we infer that Q is ill-behaved since it reduces to an authorization error on role s.
As the previous example illustrates, there are processes which respect communication specifications
but lead to authorization errors. The type system described in the following section addresses this issue.
Ghilezan, Jaksˇic´, Pantovic´, Pe´rez, Vieira 5
B ::= end | B | B | ♦B | pl(M).B T ::= l(B)
M ::= B | T | r p ::= !r | ?r | (r → r) :
Figure 2: Conversation types
3 Type System
We consider the conversation types language as presented in [1], extending message type M with the role
r, so that we may capture role authorization passing. This is a rather natural extension, formally given by
the syntax in Figure 2. Behavioral types B include: end, which describes inaction; B | B, which allows
to describe concurrent independent behavior; the sometime type ♦B, which says that behavior B may
take place immediately or later on. Finally, a behavioral type pl(M).B describes a communication action
identifying the role or roles involved, and whether the action is an input ?r or an output !r or a message
exchange (r → r) :, a carried message type M and the behavior that is prescribed to take place after the
communication action B.
We use behavioral types to specify the interactions in linear channels, where no communication
races are allowed (which is to say that at any given moment, there can only be one matching pair of
input/output actions). In our setting, where several parties may simultaneously use a channel, this linear
communication pairing is ensured via message labels: at a given moment, there can be only one pair
of processes able to exchange a labelled message. For shared channels, where communication races are
allowed, we ensure consistent usage (but no structured protocol of interaction) via shared channel types
T, which carry a (linear) behavioral type describing the usage delegated in the communication.
Message type M also captures the usages delegated in communications: in case M is a behavioral
type B or a shared channel type T it describes how the receiving process uses the received channel; in
case M identifies a role r then the message type captures an authorization delegation in the specified role.
Type environments separate linear and shared channel usages: ∆ associates channels with (linear)
behavioral types, given by ∆ ::= /0 | ∆,a : B, whereas Γ associates channels with shared channel types,
given by Γ ::= /0 | Γ,a : T . Typing rules rely on subtyping as well as on operators for apartness, well-
formedness, and splitting of types. We refer to [1] for a details on these operations. While type apartness
(#) refers to independent behaviors ensured via disjoint (message) label sets, well-formedness ensures
that parallel behaviors are apart and that the sometime ♦ is not associated to message synchronizations —
synchronizations are not allowed to take place sometime later, they are always specified to take place at a
given stage in the protocol. The subtyping relation <: allows for (some) behaviors which are prescribed
to take place immediately to be used in contexts that expect such behaviors to take place sometime (♦)
further along. Type splitting supports the distribution of protocol “slices” among the participants in a
conversation: we write B = B1 ◦B2 to say that behavior B may be split in behaviors B1 and B2 so that an
overall behavior B may be distributed (e.g., in the two branches of a parallel composition). We remark
that B1 and B2 may be further split so as to single out the individual contributions of each participant in
a conversation, where decomposition is driven by the structure of the process in the typing rules.
We lift the split relation to ∆ type environments in unsurprising lines: ∆,a : B = ∆1,a : B1 ◦∆2,a : B2
if B = B1 ◦B2 and ∆ = ∆1 ◦∆2, and also ∆,a : B = ∆1,a : B ◦∆2 (and symmetrically) if ∆ = ∆1 ◦∆2. In
typing rules we write ∆1 ◦∆2 to represent ∆ (if there is such ∆) such that ∆ = ∆1 ◦∆2.
A typing judgment is of the form ∆;Γ ⊢Σ P. The authorization set Σ is a subset of the direct product
of the set of channel names and the set of roles, i.e., Σ ⊆ N ×R. The typing judgment states that the
process P is well typed under ∆ and Γ with roles from pr2(Σ) (the projection on the second element of
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[T-end]
∆end;Γ ⊢ /0 0
[T-snew]
∆;Γ,a : l(B) ⊢Σ P
∆;Γ ⊢Σ (νa)P
[T-new]
∆,a : B;Γ ⊢Σ P matched(B) a 6∈ pr1(Σ)
∆;Γ ⊢Σ (νa)P
[TProc-par]
∆1;Γ ⊢Σ P ∆2;Γ ⊢Ξ Q
∆1 ◦∆2;Γ ⊢Σ∪Ξ P | Q
[Trole-in]
∆◦a : B;Γ ⊢Σ∪{(a,s)} P ?r l(s).B <: B′ Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉)
∆◦a : B′;Γ ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉?l(s).P
[Trole-out]
∆◦a : B;Γ ⊢Σ P !r l(s).B <: B′ Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉)∪unauth(a,⌊s⌉)
∆◦a : B′;Γ ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉!l(⌊s⌉).P
[T-in]
∆◦a : B,b : B′;Γ ⊢Σ P ?r l(B′).B <: B′′ Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉) b 6∈ pr1(Σ)
∆◦a : B′′;Γ ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉?l(b).P
[T-out]
∆◦a : B;Γ ⊢Σ P !r l(B′).B <: B′′ Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉)
∆◦a : B′′ ◦b : B′;Γ ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉!l(b).P
[T-lsin]
∆◦a : B′;Γ,b : T ⊢Σ P ?r l(T ).B′ <: B Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉) b 6∈ pr1(Σ)
∆◦a : B;Γ ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉?l(b).P
[T-lsout]
∆◦a : B′;Γ,b : T ⊢Σ P !r l(T).B′ <: B Ξ = Σ∪unauth(a,⌊r⌉)
∆◦a : B;Γ,b : T ⊢Ξ a⌊r⌉!l(b).P
[T-sin]
∆,b : B;Γ,a : l(B) ⊢Σ P b 6∈ pr1(Σ)
∆;Γ,a : l(B) ⊢Σ a⌈r⌉?l(b).P
[T-sout]
∆;Γ,a : l(B) ⊢Σ P
∆◦b : B;Γ,a : l(B) ⊢Σ a⌈r⌉!l(b).P
Figure 3: Typing rules. We define: unauth(a,⌊q⌋) = {(a,q)},unauth(a,⌈q⌉) = /0
the pairs in Σ) appearing in P unauthorized on corresponding channels from pr1(Σ).
Typing rules are presented in Figure 3. There are two rules that are specific to our model:
- [Trole-in] types authorization reception of the role s on the linear channel a, under the role ⌊r⌉, with
the authorization set diminished by (a,s), and enlarged with (a,r) in case ⌊r⌉ is ⌊r⌋.
- [Trole-out] types sending of the authorization ⌊s⌉ on linear channel a, under the role ⌊r⌉, with the
authorization set enlarged with (a,r) or (a,s) in case ⌊r⌉ is ⌊r⌋ or ⌊s⌉ is ⌊s⌋.
Notice that in both rules the typing environment in the conclusion is split in a typing of a that specifies
the reception of the authorization (up to subtyping).
All other rules are similar to the typing rules from [1], with the derivation of the novel decoration Σ
as follows. Rule [T-end] states that a well-typed inactive process has no unauthorized roles and only end
usages of linear channels (denoted by ∆end). Rule [T-new] types a restricted linear name if it (a) has no
unauthorized roles and (b) has no unmatched communications (no output or input communication pre-
fixes). Rule [T-snew] types a restricted shared name, without any additional restriction on unauthorized
roles. Rules [T-in], [T-out], [T-lsin] and [T-lsout] type input/output actions under the role ⌊r⌉, with the
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authorization set enlarged with (a,r) in case ⌊r⌉ is ⌊r⌋. Notice the typing environment in the conclusion
of rules [T-out] and [T-sout] mentions the usage delegated in the communication (via splitting). Rules
[T-sin] and [T-sout] state that input and output actions on shared channels are well typed only under
authorized roles. The authorization is not performed on shared channels, implying that pr1(Σ) are lin-
ear and not changed under actions on shared channels. Rule [TProc-par] states that the unauthorized
pairs in a parallel composition of two processes is the union of unauthorized pairs of the two composed
processes. We say that a process P is well typed if there are ∆ and Γ such that ∆;Γ ⊢ /0 P.
Proposition 1 (Error free) If P is a well-typed process, then P is not an authorization error.
We define the reduction relation → between behavioral types B and corresponding environments ∆ by
allowing a synchronized communication prefix to reduce to its continuation (s → r) : l(M).B → B, so
as to mimic the respective process behavior, by allowing reduction to occur in a branch of a parallel
composition (e.g., B1 → B2 =⇒ B | B1 → B | B2), and by lifting the relation point-wise to environments,
embedding reflexivity so as to encompass process reductions involving shared or bound channels (where
no reduction in the linear usages of free names is required).
Theorem 1 (Type Preservation) Let ∆;Γ ⊢Σ P for some ∆,Γ,Σ and P. If P → Q then there is ∆′ such
that ∆ → ∆′ and ∆′;Γ ⊢Σ Q.
A direct consequence of type preservation is protocol fidelity: every reduction of the process corre-
sponds to a reduction of the types, thus ensuring that the process follows the protocols prescribed by the
types. Notice that communication safety (no type mismatches in communications) is entailed by proto-
col fidelity, which in our case also attests that processes agree in the role when sending and receiving
authorizations. Combining freedom from errors and type preservation results we immediately obtain our
notion of type safety, which ensures that well-typed processes never reach an error configuration.
Corollary 1 (Type safety) If P is a well-typed process and P→∗ Q, then Q is not an authorization error.
4 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
Role-based access control in distributed systems with dynamic access rights was handled in [8] by means
of a type system, which ensures security properties. In this calculus, roles assigned to data can be
dynamically administered, while role communication between processes was not treated.
Previous works consider security properties, like confidentiality and integrity, in the setting of ses-
sion calculi. For instance, in [2] session types are extended with correspondence assertions, a form of
dependent types which ensures consistency of data during computation. More recently, aspects of secure
information flow and access control have been addressed for sessions in [3, 5, 6]. A kind of role-based
approach is used in [7], where communication is controlled by a previously acquired reputation.
Similarly to our work, the work [9] consider a typed approach to role-based authorizations, in the set-
ting of service-oriented applications. Differently from our model, assigned roles are initially authorized
and communicated data carries information on roles that will use it.
Our contribution is based on the previous work on conversation types [4] and their extension with
dynamic assignment of roles to several parties in a concurrent system [1]. We focused on a modular
extension of the existing framework, so as to leverage on the previous results, adding the minimal ele-
ments so as to identify the specific issues at hand and set the basis for further exploration. We consider the
problem of role authorization and authorization passing in an extension of the pi-calculus, where commu-
nication prefixes are annotated with role authorizations. The underlying calculus allows for the dynamic
communication of authorizations. We then extend the conversation type system in which a well-typed
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process can never incur in an authorization error. In this way we can statically distinguish processes that
are always authorized to communicate on behalf of a role including when authorizations are dynamically
passed in messages. As a natural continuation of this study, we aim to extend the present calculus with
tools that will enable role de-authorization. For this purpose, we aim to equip the type system with qual-
ified (authorized or unauthorized) roles, instead of unqualified ones. In such a calculus, we could model
authorization removal and authorization lending. Moreover, by introducing a partial order into the set of
roles, we could control communicated roles with the aim to provide absence of authorization leaks.
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